Adversarial Systems in AI: Lessons from Crypto

Lessons from Mechanism Design
in Adversarial Conditions

dmarz   Flashbots

New Collectives  ×  Variant  ·  NYC  ·  2026.11.09
Before we start

Disclaimer

The talk prompt
“As a product manager, research engineer, and R&D coordinator who has launched multiple products at the intersection of incentive design, distributed systems, and privacy in “permissionless markets”, please create a succinct representation of your key lessons in the form of a slide deck.”
Before we start

Some terms and the setting

Example 1.1

PoW Ethereum

Lesson 01

If your system has value, assume your APIs are an attack surface.

Example 1.2

Public mempool

Lesson 02

Whatever you do for decentralization is at odds with privacy, efficiency, or both and maybe even more.

Example 1.3

Priority Gas Auctions (PGAs)

Lesson 03

Your allocation rule is a spec for bot behavior. Reward speed and re-bidding, and you get latency races and spam.

Daian et al., “Flash Boys 2.0”, 2019
Double click

MEV

Lesson 04

MEV. Whoever orders the transactions can extract value, and someone will.

Double click

The MEV trilemma

Example 1.4

MEV-geth

Lesson 05

Pseudo-protocolizing the bad thing (front-running) is better than ignoring it.

Example 1.4

MEV-geth: the ordering rule

Lesson 06

Ordering rules in a distributed system are very hard to enforce.

Double click

Seeing like a protocol

Example 1.4

MEV-geth: the outcome

Lesson 07

Trust-based guarantees can and should be used as a crutch to make progress.

Example 1.5

The bundle relay

Lesson 08

Web2 rate limiting is both futile and table stakes when you cannot tell who the user is.

Example 1.5

The bundle relay: reputation

Lesson 09

Incentivizing good is generally more successful than punishing bad.

Example 1.5

The bundle relay: aftermath

Lesson 10

Always assume cat and mouse. No reprieve from anonymous strangers chasing $$$.

Example 2

“Low Carb Crusader”

Lesson 11

Incentives rule everything around me. And I'm generally skeptical that anything involving slashing is a good deterrent.

Example 2

“Low Carb Crusader”: the payoff

Lesson 12

MEV is incredibly spiky.

Flashbots post-mortem, April 2023
Example 2

“Low Carb Crusader”: the bond

Lesson 13

Even sybil resistance techniques like staking are not perfect.

Example 3

An impossibility result for sybil-proofness

Lesson 14

The only sybil-proof, incentive compatible mechanism is the second-price auction.

Pan, Mamageishvili, Schlegel, “On Sybil-proof Mechanisms”, 2024
Example 4

MEV and the limits of scaling

Lesson 15

If you don't design an explicit auction, you will get an implicit one: a latency race or a spam war.

Robert Miller, “MEV and the Limits of Scaling”, Flashbots, June 2025
Example 5

“Fair ordering”

Lesson 16

Permissionless markets are the true test, not your formal proof.

Example 5

“Fair ordering”: fair to whom?

Lesson 17

Fair is subjective. Arrow told us, but you have to learn it the hard way.

TL;DR

Three things to take home

  1. There is no perfect protocol.Models behind formal proofs lag the frontier of attacks. Auction and distributed systems theory almost all assume you know the participants, or that the system is permissioned.
  2. Security is always cat and mouse.Ship a strong imperfect solution you can triage and iterate on fast.
  3. There are always tradeoffs.If there isn't one, you're missing something.
Bonus

Teaser: Swarm Safety

What's next

Lots of interesting directions around defining safety properties across a swarm.